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This paper discusses the impact of inflation on
redistribution and poverty. It focuses on the regressive nature of the
inflation tax and the limited extent of its impact on those individuals
below the poverty line. Although the inflation tax does not effeot those
individuals below the poverty line due to their negligible average cash
holdings, it may wipe out the savings of the middle class and increase the
number of poor. In this sense it widens inequality of income and increases
poverty.
It also argues that inflation affects poverty mainly
through its impact on real wages because nominal wages fail to increase as
fast as prices in episodes of rising inflation rates. In the context of
full employment there is no satisfactory explanation for partial
indexation, but the empirical evidence shows that perfect indexation does
not exist and that wages increase more slowly than prices during episodes
of high inflation.
Finally it explores the impact on poverty of
stabilization programs and discusses whether some programs are less costly
in terms of increased poverty than othera. Both orthodox programs and
attempts to reduce inflation by the implementation of incomes polity in
Latin America have not helped the poor.3
DOES INFlATION MATTER?
Boutsof inflation in the 198Dm have revived
economists' interest in populism. The recent literature1 stresses the
repeated willingness of Latin American regimes to push demand beyond
economic constraints in an effort to improve the lot of all income groups
simultaneously. The result is a set of unsustainable macroeconomic
policies and the collapse of the economy. Workers wind up worse off than
they were at the beginning of the populist period, but even before the
collapse, inflation acceleration erodes real incomes.
Inflation increases poverty in two ways. First, the
inflation tax can reduce dispomable income. Second, if nominal wegea
increase less than the price of goods consumed by wsge earners, workers'
real income will decline.
This section uses Brazilian data to define and
illustrate the inflation tax and to discuss its regressive effects.Then I
move the focus to the impact of rising inflation rates on wages.
The Inflation Tax
The share of the inflation tax in GOP is defined as:
(1) ft
—[a/(l+a)](h/y)
where h is the average between the monetary base of the current and the
previous December; y is COP, and a is the inflation race.4
To calculate the inflation tax we need to know the
amount of real balances people hold. Figure 1 shows the ratio of the
monetary base2 to COP in Brazil between 1970 and 1990.. In 1970, after many
years of inflation, thia ratio was already low in comparison to other
countries. But as inflation continued to increase, the monetary base/COP
ratio declined further. By 1985, the monetary baae was equivalent to 2
percent of COP. The fitted line in figure 1 (Period: 1970-1990, t-
stetiatica in parentheses) is:
(2) 1og(h/y) —-1.4-0.18log l!t + 0.42 1og(h/y).1 + (0.58) dunimy
(-3.46) (2.84) (4.71)
—0.94;I useone dummy variable for the expected March 1990 Collor
Plan which froze monetary assets in the banks: it is zero in all years
except in 1989 and l990.
Figure 2 shows the inflation tax in Brazil. The fitted
line waa calculated by using the money demand equation estimated in (1).
The ehape of the curve which describes the inflation tax in relation to
the inflation rate depends on how fast people react to an increase in
inflation hy reducing their real cash balances, In the short run, this
reaction is captured by the coefficient of the inflation rate in equation
(1), which I call o. In the long run itiscalculated as a/(l-Ø), where
ia the coefficient of the lagged money/income variable, In the case of
Brazil the long run elasticity of demand for the real monetary hase inS
relation to inflation is 0.4, that is, the ratio of the monetary base to
income declinea by 40 percent when inflation increases by 100 percent.
Figure 3 shows how the inflation tax differs depending
on the elaaticity of demand for real cash balances. The inflation tax also
depends on the amount of teal cash balances people want to hold when there
is no inflation as illustrated in figure 4.
Two implications follow from this analysis. First,
countries with the same inflation will exhibit different inflation tax
revenues, depending on their money demand functiona. Table 1 shows
seigniorage4 as a share of GOP and inflation rates for selected Latin
American countries. Second, different groups within a country will pay an
inflation tax which will erode different proportions of their income.
i-low Re&tessjve La the Inflation Tax?
The inflation tax is regressive because it wipes out the savings of the
middle-income classes. But those, who were already poor before inflation
started, pay an insignificant amount of their income as an inflation tax,
How auth income does the poorest quintile of the population lose in the
form of an inflation tax? Almost nothing. The lowest quintile of the
population has no savings and aa long as they get paid weekly and the
inflation rate remains below 100 percent per year, the inflation tax will
amount to Less than 1 percent of their income, even if they spread their
expenditures evenly during the week. This is easy to show.6
Assuming that a worker has no assets, gets paid weekly,
and spreads his expenditures evenly during the week, his cash balances are
equal to one half of his weekly income, yb,, and the inflation tax he pays
weekly Is:
(3) Tw —0.5y
where: trw is the weekly inflation rate.
Since there are 52 weeks in one yesr, the ratio between the snnual
inflation tax sad ennual incose is:
(4) 52 [0.5 y.(rr/(l-iir))] /52y, —0.5
In general, as Inflation accelerates, the wage payment
period is reduced from once a nonth to once a week, and finally to daily
payments during periods of hyperinflation. Table 2 shows the inflation tax
as a share of income under the assumption that workers get paid monthly
(column 4) orweekly(column 5) and spread their expenditures evenly
during the period between payments.
As inflatic6 increases, workers purchase virtually all
their neceasitiea as soon as they get paid, keeping enough cash fcr
transportation if they csnnot get their bus passes in advance. Table 3
shows what happens when they spend half their income on the day they get
paid and the other half evenly during the rest of the period.7
Assuming that the inflation race is 20 percent per
year, that workers get paid monthly, and that they spread their payments
evenly during the month, workers would pay 0.75 percent of their annual
income aa an inflation tax. If inflation increases to 100 percent per year
without any institutional changes the tax would increase to 2.8 percent of
annual inoome. But if payments were changed to a weekly basis and workers
changed their spending habits to those shown in table 3, the inflation tax
would decline to 0,3 percent of income. When inflation reaches 1,000
percent per year, life gets tougher. Even with weekly payments and a
ohenge in spending habita, the inflation tax tan eat 1 percent of workers'
incomes. But this is peanuts compared to the decline they experience in
their real wages, as will be discussed later.
Table 4 illustrates this argument by showing numbers
for inflation, the share of the monetary base in SOP, and the inflation
tax in Brazil, Between 1970 and 19W, the inflation rate increased from 20
to 100 percent. In response to the increase in inflation, the demand for
real cash balances fell and the share of the real monetary base declined
from 8.2 percent of 00? to 4.6 percent, The inflation tax increased from
1.4 to 2.3 peroent of COP. Some income groups lost more than 2 percent of
their income in the fern of an inflation tax, while others lost less.
Wealthy citizens who reacted fast to inflation and had access to other
forms of assets such as indexed deposits may not have paid as much.
Neither did the very poor. The inflation tax paid by the lowest quintile
of the population increased but resained negligible.B
By 1990, inflation had increased to 2,700 percent and
the inflation tax paid by the poor as a share of their income had risen to
1.5 percent. Compared to other taxes, the inflation tax remained small.
Inflation and Real Wages
Inflation stabilization does not come without costs. It
is usually associated with a recession which generally means more
unemployment and lower real wages. But accelerating inflation also reduces
real wages and increases poverty. This second effect dominated the scene
in Latin America between 1977 and 1989.
Equation (5) was estimated using panel data for average
reel wages, average annual inflation rates, and average annual resl growth
rate, between 1977 and 1989, in seven Latin American countries (Argentina,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and uruguay) for which average
real wages are available for the whole period.5 The regression uees seven
country-dummies; w is real wage, s is inflation, and x is real GOP growth
rate per year.
(5) log(w) —2.16-0.14log (t)+ 0.15log(l+x)
(-8.22) (0.53)
—0.57
t-ststics in parentheses, 98 observations.
Included in the regression sre countries with very high9
and variable inflation rates, such as Argentina and Peru, and countriea
with relatively stable and low rates such ss Colombia. In many countries,
there are years during which real wages declined with inflation in
response to stabilization programs. But the effect of falling real wages
during periods of rising inflation totally dominates other influences.
According to equation (3), real wages fall by 14 percent when inflation
doubles, Figures 5-9 show episodes of rising inflation and declining real
wages in Argentina, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay.
The careful study of poverty in Argentina by Morley and
Alvarez (1991) confirms the importance of a decline in real wages as a
determinant of poverty growth in Argentina.6 The percentage of people in
poverty in Creater Buenos Aires increased from 6 percent in 1980 to 11
percent in 1986, and to 22 percent in 1989 (Table 5). Morley and Alvarez's
sectorsl and occupational decomposition of the aggregate poverty indices
in Table S show the rising headcount ratio within industry and occupation
of production workers. The authors conclude that in the 1989 Argentine
recession, poverty increased because real wsgee went down for working
people in both the formal and informal sector and in part also because
retirement incomes and transfers were inadequately indexed for inflation.
They do not find unemployment per se as a significant additional source of
poverty in the 1980s in Argentina.
The costs of inflation for wage earners also include
oscillations in their real income. Figure 10 shows the real minimum wage10
in Brazil, between 1975 and 1991, and it illustrates the shortcomings of
indexation. For individuals who are liquidity constrained, the significant
oscillation in their real wages means that they cannot smooth conauniption
or that their reel dispoable income will be eroded if they try to carry
cash from one month to the next.
THE IMPACT OF STABILIZATION ON POVERTY
Just as populism stands for the felse dream that growth
per capita can exceed productivity growth, the question as to whether the
poor suffer from edjuetment programs poses a misleading dilemma. Clearly
adjustment programs, which call for a reduction in government expenditures
end devaluations, reduce real income and increase unemployment in the
short run. But adjustment is unavoidable in most cases and the decline in
welfare observed during adjustment programs derives in good measure from
conditions that existed preceding these programs: declining terms of
trade, reduced external finance, increased debt service costs, and
unsustainable deficits.7 Nonetheless, one must ask whether some programs
are less costly in terms of increased poverty than others.
The answer to this question can be found by weighing
the costs of successful stabiliration programs which did not make use of
incomes policy compared with those which did. The answer may differ for
moderate versus high inflation stabilization.
Oornbusch and Fischer (1991) suggest that seigniorage
plays at most a modest role in the persistence of moderate inflationsII
which are mainly explained by inertia. Such inflation can be reduced only
at a substantial short-term cost to growth. They examine four oases and
conclude that "there is unfortunately little encouragement in these case
studies for the view that an exchange rate commitment, or incomes Policy?
allows a country to move et low cost from moderate to low inflation. ,8
What can be concluded by comparing four oases of high
inflation atabilization? Chile in 1974-76 and Bolivia in 1985-56 are
exemples of countries that succeeded in bringing down inflation without
using incomes policy as a central policy instrument. Brazil in 1964-65 snd
Mexico in 1988-89 are examples of countries where inoomea policy was
successfully used to atop inflation.
Unemployment and poverty increased significantly in
Bolivia and Chile (Table 6) during the stabilization years, but both
programs coincided with s dramatic fall in these countries' terms of
trade, which in part explains the severity of the recessions and the
increase in poverty they suffered.
In Brezil (1965) and in Mexico (1988), although the
recession socompanying inflation stabilization was less pronounced than in
Chile (1974-75) and Bolivia (1985-86), there is no evidence that incomes
policy helped the poor. In Brazil, the concentration of income in the
l960s resulted largely from policies restraining nominal wages during the
mtabiiization program In Mexico, the mo-called social pact was only used
after five years of recession and a dramatic decline in real wages. The12
Mexican government has not yet made available the 1989 household income-
expenditure survey, but there is reason to suspect that the poor in 1989
were not eny better off than in 1984 (Table 7).
In Brazil (with incomes policy) end in Chile (without
incomes policy), stabilization wes forced on wage-earners by a military
dictatorship. In Bolivia (without incomes policy) and in Mexico (with
incomes policy), an elected government had clout over unions. In
dictatorships or democracies, with or without incomes policy, political
compromise is essential to balance budgets and stop high inflation.
Worlcers0 claims to higher wages have to be restrained; entrepreneurs have
to accept lower profita taxpayers have to beer additional obligations.
Moreover, even dictatorships must have the ability to develop institutions
for concerted action against inflation if their programs are to succeed.
In the four cases under discussion, stabilization was imposed by a
technocratic elite which had the support of important segments of society
end which was able to develop institutions to sustain disinflation.
Even in well conceived adjustment programs, the poor
are especially hard hit by the transition costs. the poor have less room
to cope with the radical policy moves which produce sectoral dislocation
of resources and eaployinent. Changes in relative prices, unemployment, and
reduction of social expenditures will hurt the poor. Incomes policies do
exist which, in principle, would help a more equitable stabilization
program, but the success of these policies requires that the government be13
accepted as legitimate by the relevant social actors and that organized
labor, industrialists, and politicians have a reaaonahly compatible
strategy.
Solutions which appear to be under government control
(such as the Austral Plan in Argentina or the Cruzado Plan in Brazil) but
lack macroeconomic consistency will fail. There is nothing worse for
poverty than failed stabilization programs that lead to rising inflation
and further recession. During the 1980s Argentina suffered from two
serious recessions interrupted in 1986 by a short and shallow recovery. By
the late 1980s recession and hyperinflation came together in a powerful
stagflation. Argentina, with only 6 percent of its population in poverty
in 1980, saw that number increase to 20 percent because of its erratic
macroeconomics (Table 5).
in Brazil, the same disastrous combination of inflaticn
and failed attempts at stabilization also led to no progresa on the fight
against poverty, table 8 shows the headcount, the normalized income gap,
foster, and Sen indices for Brazil between 1960 and 1988. The poverty line
is set at approximately one real minimum wage.9
The figures are telling, Between 1960 and 1970, the
headcount index shows that poverty in Brazil remained unchanged despite
annual income growth per capita in excess of 3 percent. The lack of
progress on the poverty front resulted from the worsening of income
distribution in the l960s: real wages of skilled labor increased while14
real wages of non-skilled labor fell. The decline in the real wages of the
poor was primarily a result of the rise in inflation before 1964 and of
the mid-1960s recesaionJ° The income share of the poorest 40 percent of
the population fell from 16 percent in 1960 to 13 percent in 1970. In
1970, approximately 40 percent of the population was poor.
During the 1970s, a period of rapid economic growth.
the headcount was reduced by nearly half, despite a further decline in the
share of income going to the poorest 40 percent of the population. It is
also notable that the Sen index in 1960 also fell to half of its value in
1970, The decline in the Sen index may derive from a large number of poor
moving above the poverty line and thua from a change in the weights of
poverty gaps and not from a reduction of disparity among the poor.
From 1981 to 1983, all poverty indices in Brazil
increased. Rocha (1990), Fox and Morley (1991), and Ravaillon and Datt
(1991) offer detailed studies of the relationship between the 1982-83
recession and the increase in poverty.
Having argued that inflation, stabilization, and
adjustment are costly. I must accept that the only consistent alternative
open to governments is the maintainance of conservative macroeconomic
policies. On these grounds, the Colombian example stands out.
The eclectic Colombian system used exchange controls
but avoided the extreme protectionism of other Latin American countries;
its crawling peg kept the exchange rate at reasonable levels and the15
government avoided inflationary finance. By stimulating housing
construction and exports other than coffee, Colombia experienced sustained
growth and avoided the spectacular crises found elsewhere in Latin
America. Long run data from the turn of the century to 1988 shows a
Kutneta-type of U-shaped curve for Colombia, with a sharp deterioration in
income equality up to the lPGOs and improvement since then The dominant
factors at work have been a shift of the lahor force from agriculture to
industry, broader access to fonsl education, and demographic changes.
Education's role in determining the distribution of income was perhapas
more important than macroeconomic policy. Evidence from the 197Cc also
indicates that the wsges of agricultural workers increased faster than
national income, while wages of lower-income urban workers graw faster
than wages of higher-income urban workers and salaries of white-collar
eaployees. At the same time, the tax system was slightly progressive in
the 196Cc, and vas more so after the reforms of 1974-75. The income of che
first decile was twice as high after taxes and government transfers, while
the income share of the top decile was reduced. A recent survey by the
Colombian Ministries of Planning end Agriculture shows thac the incidence
of povarty among rural families fell from 52 percent to 32 percent over
the period 1976-88.
in both the l970s and the 1980s, education, hesith, and
public services such as water, electricity, and welfare programs
substantially raised standards of living among low income families, During16
the period from 1973 to 1985, the share of rural households with access to
electricity rose from 15 to 41 percent, end rural illiteracy fell from 29
to 23 percent. Although rural income distribution remained strikingly
unequal as of 1958, the productivity gap between small farmers and large
producers had dramatically decreased as a result of government efforts to
channel resources for modernization into the cemoesino sector.
Liukaila (1991) estimates that the initial negative
impact of the adjustment program of 1985 was largely cushioned by action
on the minimum wage and by the exemption of food from the 8 percent import
surchage. By 1986, under the influence of the coffee boon, real wages had
recovered as had growth and employment.
Nonetheless, serious problems of poverty have persisted
throughout this period of sustained economic growth and social change.
Income distribution remains skewed with incomes of the top 20 percent of
households six to seven tines that of the bottom 20 percent. Moreover,
gains in the social indicators hide the sharp differences in health and
education among rich and poor. The predicament of landless peasants
remains unchanged, although it is overshadowed by the conditions of the
urban poor found in growing numbers in city slums.
?rogress has been slow. The very poor cannot gain from
neutral growth because they start from a very small base. They need
poverty programs. Increased taxation might prove indispensable to finance
such programs, unless governments can rely on revenues from privatization,17
Poverty Protrams
Given the extent of poverty in LatinAmericaany program will need to
combine policies that allow the poor to increase current consumption with
investment to generate future growth of their income. These policies must
consider the links among income, health, and education, and give special
emphasis to female education, given the evidence that women's education
has a strong positive effect in reducing fertility rates and reducing
child mortality)-2
A first step in undertaking poverty progams is to carry
out a household income-expenditure survey. These surveys already exist in
many Latin American countries and the World Bank's Living Standards
Measurement Study unit has quickly carried out surveys on personal
computers. Crootaert and Marchant (1991) provide guidelines for
identifying target groups and monitoring policy.
Second, one muat look for successful programs arid
determine their relevance to other countries and situations)-3 In Latin
America, which policy initiatives are known for efficient targeting and
competent delivery of social services? Are there successful emergency
programs after stabilization? Recent discussion has focused on programs
developed in Bolivia Mexico, and Chile.
Bolivia
In Bolivia, the econcmic crisis of the 1980s exacerbated deep-rooted
poverty problems and prompted che government to launch the Emergency18
Social Fund (ESF) to cushion the adverse effects of the 1985 stabilization
and adjustmant program. The ESF aimed at providing temporary employment
opportunities and bolstering basic social services, ma staff of the tSP
approved or rejected funds requested for small-scale, labor-intensive
projects that came from local governments or non-governmental agencies.
The ESF closed its operations on March 1991 with 3,269 projects (US$191
million) completed.
Newman et at, (1991) estimate that the sverage ESF
worker received a 32 percent increese in weekly earnings over what he
would have earned if- he were working in the absence of the ESF. The
demand-driven emergency program (the agency did not propose any projects
itself) helped lessen the hardships of unemployment during adjuetment.
This program also achieved notable success in establishing relationships
with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Nonetheless poverty
alleviation in Bolivia still requires greater effort and targeting. To
this end, the government started the Social Investment Fund in 1991.
Mexico
In response to che ].9B2 crisis, a restricti'e demand policy and sweeping
reforms took place in Mexico. Between 1982 end 1988 the cumulative growth
per capita was negative and the resl minimum wage fell by one-half, For
most of the l9BOs, social spending was held hostage to Mexico's dire
economic problems. Throughout the adjustment period, there was a
substantial deterioration in social conditions. Real per capita19
expenditures in the social sectors fell by about 7 percent per year, and
public investment in rural and regional development dropped by 80 to 90
percent in the 1980s.14 In the short-term, the decade long recession
combined with free-msrket reforms and cuts in social expenditures have
exacerbated Mexico's highly unequal income distribution.
President Carlos Salinas' answer was the Solidarity
Program (Prorrama Macional de Solidaridad, Pronasol), initiated in
December 1988, covering programs on health, education nutrition, housing,
employment, and infrastructure. The broad participation of the program's
beneficiaries is sought in setting priorities: the program sharply raises
the stake that villagers and townspeople have in the projects. Solidarity
pays for materials, but families who share a school or street oversee the
project as well as its budget, and build the project themselves with
technicsl advice. The program built almost 1,200 health centers in 1989-
91, paved roads, laid sewer lines, refurbished schools, instslled
drinking-water systems, and distributed rural credit. Its political impact
helped the ruling party to win mid-term elections in August 1991.
The ideas behind Solidarity coincided with the
decentralization of social services sponsored by foreign aid experts. The
World Bank will lend $350 million for a regional development program under
the auspices of Solidarity. The program targets the poor and indigenous
producers in the states of Chiapsa, Guerrero, Hidalgo, and Oaxsta. The
project has three components: investment, institutional developsent, and20
environmental and archeological site protection. Recently approved
projects on basic health? primary education, and nutrition complement the
regional investment programs. Migration from the poorest areas to growth
poles will continue to take place, but unlese those who leave have
acquired some human capital, they will just swell the number of unskilled
workere in the slums of the great cities. This is why the government
intends to provide special assistance to the underdeveloped states.
The social situation in Mexico is overshadowed by a
decade of dramatic decline. Only three years old, the Solidarity progrsm
has not been able to erase the scars left by the recession of the l9SOs.
But the substantially funded program is making its mark, even though it is
still too early to evaluate Solidarity's impact on poverty.
Chile
Recent social policies in Chile and their impact on poverty are
controversial. Not surprisingly the democratic opposition to the military
regime charged severe neglect on the social front, aggravating an already
poorly performing economy until 1984 In 1987, the percentage of Chileans
households in poverty had more than doubled from 6 percent in 1970 to more
than 13.5 percent in 1987 (Table 5). Income distribution inequality also
increased dramatically and the Cmi index was 0.63 in 1989.
Protagonists of the military regime, by contrast, show
evidence of improvement in living standards as measured by social
indicators. Reduction of infant mortality is extrsordinary in compsrison21
to other countries in Latin America, even if such achievement represents
the continuation of s long term trend (Figure 11).
The debate remains open. The questions surround two
issues. One is the interpretation of a renge of social indicators (Tables
5 and 9) The other is bow to understand the change in indicators: were
they driven by macroeconomic developments or by social policies?
Between 1974 end 1989, social policies targeted the
poor avoiding spill-oven to the middle class. Moreover, the private
sector was assigned an enhanced role in providing social services and an
effort was made to use market mechanisms in the distribution of services.
Castaneda (1991), a strong supporter of these reforms1
provides a carefuL explanation of the decentralization measurea undertaken
in education health, and housing. Chile also privatized its national
pension fund in 1981. Under the prior systea, workers, firms, and the
state paid into a common fund administered by the state. Benefits bore
little relationship to ccntributions, which failed to accumulate in value.
Under the new system, private firms collect payments, manage funds, and
supervise distributions. Pensions have increased markedly. At the same
time, payments to the disabled and to widows and orphans are more than
twice their previous level. Castaneda believes that overall the results of
the reforms were highly positive. He uses broad social indicators (such sa
the decline in infant mortality) to support this view.
Coleccion Escudios Cienlan (1991) and Mideplan (August
1991) develop the opposite view. They observe that government expenditures22
were cut. Even though the share of social expenditures in total
expenditures increased significantly, the share of social expenditures in
GD? remained barely constant (Table 10), The increase of this share in the
mid-l980s is due to the following: with the reform of the pension fund,
the government remained in charge of the retirees of the old system.
Payments to retirees caused a fourfold increaee of expenditures in this
area which was included in total social spending. This explains most of
the increase in real social expenditures per capita during the 1980s after
the aevere cuts in l97479 (Figure 12).
Meller (1991) argues that the adjustment measures of
the l980s were regressive even though the government was successful in
targeting social expenditures toward the very poor. The authorities
provided generous subsidies to dollar debtors while reducing subsidies to
the unemployed.
Poverty in Chile undoubtedly increased during the
military regime because of the deep recession in 1974 and 1983. Until the
last household survey in 1987, the economic recovery had not been enough
to improve the-lot of the low income groups. Social expenditures became
better targeted and in this sense became more efficient. But social
programs remained too modest to counteract the effects of unemployment
which remained high until 1988. On assuming power In 1990, the new
democratic government significantly increased the social effort. The new
government supports the view that good macroeconomic policies complemented23
by a safety net of well-designed social programs are essential for poverty
alleviation.24
FOOTNOTES
1 See, for instance, Dorrtbusch and Edwards (1991).
2 Average annual monetary base calculated as the average of the base in
December of the current year and the base in December of the previous
yen.
The regression implies a money demand of the form:
(14,2) h/y —
whereA is a constant and the real interest rate, r, was assumed to be
irrelevant. With rO, this functional form implies that government revenue
from seigniotage always increases with inflation. With r—O, seignorage
revenue is maximized when it—
merevenue from money creation is called eeigniorage. When inflation is
constant and income growth is zero, the seigniorage revenue is equal to
the inflation tax.
The wage data is compiled by Cox Edwards (1991). Unfortunately, Brazil
and Bolivia which suffered from extreme inflation in the l9BOs, do not
have data for aggregate average wages. Bolivia's real minimum wage shows a
strong negative correlation with inflation, but minimum wagee are set by
the government and minimum wage slow growth might simply reflect an
attempt to reduce inflation. I also do not know whether the minimum wage
legislation was effective or not. In the case of Brazil, there is data for
average industrial wages in Rio de Janeiro end Sao Paulo. Between 1977 and
1980, average real wages and inflation are positively correlated because
of strong growth and adequate indexation. Between 1986 and 1990, when25
inflation speeds up, real wages in Rio fall. In Sao Paulo they oscillate
with industrial employment.
6 We must treat poverty measures with caution, as definitions and methods
of measurement differ significantly. Indices of poverty are based on a
broad indicator of economic resources. An individual is defined as poor if
his total consumption (or total income) falla below a specified level. An
extensive literature proposes a variety 0f indices which measure poverty
on a scale of zero to unity. The most simple procedure is to count the
number of poor and calculate the percentage of the population belonging to
this category (the headcount). Another popular index is the normalized
poverty gap, which is equal to the aggregate income short-fall of the poor
as a proportion of the poverty line, divided by population. Sen rejects
this measure as insensitive to the inequalicy among the poor and he
proposes that the poverty gap be weighted by the person's rank in the
ordering of the poor. His measure can be expressed as a combination of the
headcount index, the income gap, and the Cmimeasureof inequality among
the poor (exact definition in Table 8, notes). Finally, the Foster-Creer-
Thorhecke's widely used measure (hereafter the Foster index) is based on
the sum of squared proportionate poverty gaps. It is similar to the
normalized poverty gap but it attaches greater weight to the income gaps
of the poorest individuals (exact definition in Table 5, notes).
On the welfare costs of stabilization and adjustment see, for instance,
Helleiner (1989) ,InternationalMonetary Fund (1986) ,hitWorld Bank
Economic Review (1991) ,andWorld Development (1991)
8 Dornbusch and Fischer (1991), pp.64-5.26
For the specification of poverty lines on which the measures shown in
Table 8 are based, see the notes in the same table and sources.
10 Brazilian income distribution has been the subject of extensive
literature. Cardoso and Helwege (1992) offer a brief review and
references. For a recent collection of essays on income distribution in
Brazil, see Camargo and Ciambioni (1991).
See Londono (1989), Moreno (1989), and Urrutia (1985).
12 See Rerz (1991)-
13 World Bank (1992) provides an abundance of examples. See also
Pfefferman (1991).
14 For an evaluation of the social impact of adjustment see Lustig
(1991a).27
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Rate per Year
Selected Latin Macrican Countries
Seignorage/CDP Inflation Rate















*Periods covered ate generally 1.965-89, but vary depending on data
availability.
Source: Easterly, William and Klaus Schimidt-Hebel, The Macroeconomics of
Public Sector Deficits, Working Paper 1Q15 775, World Bank, Washington
D.C.: October 1991, Table 3.1, p.46, and International Monetary Fund,
International Financial Statistics.able 2: Inflation Rates and Corresponding Inflation Tax as Share of Income
for a Person Holding One Half of his Monthly (or Weakly) Income
as Cash
(Percent)
nflation Inflation Inflation Inflation Tax/Income Inflation Tax/Income
atYearPer Month Per Week Monthly Regime Weekly Regime
3 0.25 0.06 0.12 0.03
5 0.41 0.09 0.20 0.05
20 1.53 0.33 0,75 0.18
30 2.21 0.51 1,1 0.25
50 3.44 0.78 1.7 0.39
100 5.94 1.34 2,8 0.66
500 16.10 3.51 6,9 1.69
1,000 22.10 4.72 9.1 2.25
0,000 46.90 9.28 16.0 4.25
—
— z,,/1O0Table 3: Inflation Rates and Corresponding Inflation Tax as Share of Income
for a Person Holding One Fourth of his Monthly (or Weekly) Income
- asCash
(Percent)
Inflation Inflation Inflation Inflation Tax/Income Inflation Tax/Income
Per YearPer Month Per Week Monthly Regime Weekly Regime
S O.25[(7rm/(l4irm)]*
3 0.25 0,06 0.06 0.01
5 0.41 0.09 0.10 0.02
20 1.53 0.35 0.38 0.09
30 2.21 0.51 0.54 0.13
50 3.44 0.78 0.83 0.19
100 5.94 1.34 1.40 0.33
500 16.10 3.51 3.47 0.85
1.000 22.10 4.72 4.53 1.13
10.000 46.90 9.28 8.00 2.12
* —




Inflation (percent per year) 20.0 100.0 2,700.0
Monetary Easea/CDP 8.2 4,6 2.3
Monetary Ease Hold by the Lowest Quintile
ae a Share of Their annual incomeb 0.5 0.5 0.5
Inflation Tax Paid by the Iiwest
Quinti].e as a Share of Their Income0 0.1 0.3 1.6
Inflation Tax Paid by the owest
Quintile as a Share of GOP 0.002 0.008 0.04
Inflation Tax/GOP, Paid by
80% of population5 1.4 2.3 2.3
Total Inflation Tax/GOP 1.4 2.3 2.3
a average during the year
b under the assumption that workers get paid weekly, spend half their
weely payment on the same day, and the other half evenly through the week,
their cash balances aa a share of their annual income is (0.25 y/ 52y) —
0.25/52—.005.
c calculated as: 0.25 rw/(l-t-irw), where ir., is the weekly inflation rate
see table 6).
the inflation tax/GOP paid by the lowest quintile is equal to the
inflation tax paid by the lowest quintile divided by their income and
multiplied by the share of their income in total income.
e 80 percent of the population receives 97.6 percent of total income, the
lowest quintile receives 2.4 percent of total income.
Sources: Conjuntura Economica, Institute Erasileiro de Geografia e
Eetatistica, author's calculations.Table 5: Poverty Indices for Greater Buenos Aires
1980- 1989
Headcount Normalized Income Foster
Gap Index
1980 .063 .018 .007
1986 .109 .033 .016
1989 .215 .081 .043
The income gapof personi with income Yjis —z-n wherez is the
poverty line. The hesdcount is H —q/n,where q —numberof people with y
<zand n —totalpopulation size. The normalized income gap is
for >0. The Foster index is
Source: Samuel Morley and Carola Alvarez, "Recession and the Growth of
Poverty in Argentina" Interamericen Development Bank: pirn,preliminary,
November 1991.Table 6: Percenta&e of Households in Poverty in Chile, 1970-1987
(The Poverty Line Is Approximately $1,000 of 1987 per year






*Thispoverty line corresponds to the cost of a food basket estimated at
$21.71 per head per aonth in urban areas and $16.73 per head per month in
rural areas.
Source: CEPAL, 'Una Estimacion de Ia Magnitud de la Pobreza en Chile,"
Colecion Estudios Cieplan, 31, March 1991, pp.107-129.Table 7: Poverty Indices
Mexico, 1984
Poverty Line Approximately $200 (of 1984) per capita, per year*
Headcount Normalized Tricome Faster Index
Cap
Rural 0.37 0.12 0.06
Urban 0.10 0.02 0.01
National 0.19 0.06 0.03
*Correspondsto the cost of a diet which provides 2,083 calories and 35.1
gravis of protein, as recommended by Coplamar, Macroeconomia de las
Necesidades Esenciales en Mexico: Situscion Actual YPersoectivasal Ano
2QQQ, Siglo XXI, Mexico City: 1983.
Source: Santiago Levy, PoverttAfl.syiatioai.ruMexito, WPS 679, World Bank,
Washington D.C.: May 1991.Table 8: Household Poverty Indices
Brazil, 1960-1988
Povery Line: Approximately One Minimum Wage per Household*
Headcount Normalized Foster Sen
Income cap Index Index




1981 0.265 0.101 0.050
1983 0,419 0.321 0.131 0.063
1985 0.262 0.099 0.048
1986 0.284
1987 0,359 0.242 0.095 0.048
1988 0.393 0.265 0.107 0,056
Sources: a Mauricio Costa Romso, "Distribuicao de Renda, Pobreza e
Desigualdadee Regionais no Brasil," in .Iose Camargo and Fabio Giambiagi,
editors, Distribuicao de Renda no Thaail,Paze Terra, Rio do Janeiro:
1991, Table 8, p.115; b Helga Hoffmann, "Poverty and Prosperity in
Brazil," in Edmar Bacha and flebert Klein, editors, Social Chante in
Brazil, 1945-1985, University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque: 1989,
tables 6.8 and 6.9, p. 217; c Ravallion, Martin and Caurav Datt, Growth
and Redistribution Componejits of Changes in Poverty Measures, LSMS Working
Paper No.83, World Bank, Washington D.C., 1991.
*Notes: The three sources use approximately one fourth of one minimum wage
per capita corrected for inflation as the poverty line for a household:
a Romao (1991) specifies the cost of a food basket for different regions
of the country (approximately half the minimum wage) and uses a different
multiplier for each region ranging between 1.5 end 2.05. The poverty line
for the country is equivalent in 1986 prices to 0.885 of the minimum wage
of September 1986; b In Hoffmsnn (1989), the poverty line is equivalent to
the minimum wage in August 1980; o In Ravaillon (1991), the poverty line
is a household income per heed of one quarter of the minirrure wage (one
minimum wage for family of four) adjusted for inflation using the
consumer's price index for a low-income consumption bundle.
The Senjodox is H(l-(l-I)[l-Q(q/(l÷q)]1,
where I —g/qzand C —I÷(l/q)
-((2/q2a)[y(q+l'i)3J,for y <zand
m —themean income of the poor.Table 9: Social Indicators in Chile
19 60-1990
Infant Mortality
(per thousand live births)
Life Expectancy








Source: Ministerio de Planificacion y Cooperation de Chile (Mideplan),
Departamento de Planificacion y Estudios Sociales, Evolution de las
Pujitices Sociales e Chile. 1920-1991, Mideplan, Santiago de Chi1e
August 1991.Table 10: Social Expenditures in Chile
1955-1990
(Percent)
Social Expenditures/ Social Expenditures/









Source: Ministerio de Planificacion y Cooperacion de Chile (Hideplan)1
Dapartamento de Planificacion y Estudios Sociales Evolucion de las
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